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ZONING SPEECH ON THE INTERNET:
A LEGAL AND TECHNICAL MODEL

Lawrence Lessig*
Paul Resnick**
Speech, it is said,1 divides into three sorts - (1) speech that every
one has a right to (political speech, speech about public affairs); (2)
speech that no one has a right to (obscene speech, child porn); and (3)
speech that some have a right to but others do not (in the United
States, Ginsberg2 speech, or speech that is "harmful to minors," to
which adults have a right but kids do not). Speech-protective regimes,
on this view, are those where category (1) speech predominates;
speech-repressive regimes are those where categories (2) and (3) pre
vail.
This divide has meaning for speech and regulation within a single
jurisdiction, but it makes less sense across jurisdictions. For when
viewed across jurisdictions, most controversial speech falls into cate
gory (3) - speech that is permitted to some in some places, but not to
others in other places. What constitutes "political speech" in the
United States (Nazi speech) is banned in Germany; what constitutes
"obscene" speech in Tennessee is permitted in Holland; what consti
tutes porn in Japan is child porn in the United States; what is "harmful
to minors" in Bavaria is Disney in New York. Every jurisdiction con
trols access to some speech3 - what we call "mandatory access con* Jack N. and Lillian R. Berkman Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies, Harvard
Law School. B.A.IB.S. 1983, Pennsylvania; M.A. 1986, Cambridge; J.D. 1989, Yale. - Ed.
Thanks to Lorrie Cranor for initially suggesting the symmetry between tagging speech and
tagging people. Thanks also to Robert Cooter, Mark Lemley, Richard Posner, and the
GALA Workshop at Boalt Law School for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Karen
King and Alexander Macgillivray provided valuable research assistance. An earlier version
of this paper has been published as "The Architectures of Mandated Access Controls," in

COMPETITION, REGULATION AND CONVERGENCE: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1998
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY REsEARCH CONFERENCE (Sharon Eisner Gillett & Ingo
Vogelsang eds., 1999).
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versity of Michigan; S.M. (Electrical Engineering and Computer Science) 1988, Ph.D. (Elec
trical Engineering and Computer Science) 1992, M.I.T. - Ed.

1. See Lawrence Lessig, What
JURIMETRICS J. 629, 638-39 (1998).

Things Regulate Speech:

CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38

2. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
3.

We reserve the term "censorship" for blanket restrictions on the distribution of
speech that apply regardless of the recipient or the context. Access control is a broader con
cept that includes not only censorship but also restrictions on speech that may depend on the
recipient or context.
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trols" - but what that speech is differs from jurisdiction to jurisdic
tion.
This diversity creates a problem (for governments at least) when
we consider speech within cyberspace. Within cyberspace, mandated
access controls are extremely difficult. If access control requires
knowing (a) the identities of the speaker and receiver, (b) the jurisdic
tions of the speaker and receiver, and (c) the content of the speech at
issue, then as cyberspace was initially designed, none of these data are
easily determined. As a result, real space laws do not readily translate
into the context of cyberspace.
One possible response to the change caused by the initial architec
ture of the Internet ("Net") would have been for governments simply
to give up on access controls. Experience suggests that this is unlikely.
As the popularity of the Net has grown, governments have shown an
increasing interest in reestablishing mandated access controls over cer
tain kinds of speech now published on the Internet. In the United
States, this speech is sex-4 or spam5-related; in Germany, it is both sex
and Nazi-related;6 in parts of Asia, it is anything critical of Asian gov
ernments.7 Across the world, governments seek to reregulate access
to speech in cyberspace, so as to reestablish local control.
We take as given this passion for reregulation. It features promi
nently in the current political reality of cyberspace. This reality should
push us to consider the options that regulators face - not because
regulators need encouragement, but because we should understand
the consequences of any particular regulatory strategy. Some strate
gies pose greater costs than others; some strike at more fundamental
features of the Net than do others. We aim to understand the trade
offs that this reregulation presents.
This inquiry is particularly salient in the United States just now. In
what may have become a biannual event, the United States Congress
in 1998 passed its second attempt at regulating "indecent speech" on
the Net - the Child Online Protection Act8 ("COPA"). Its first stat
ute, the Communications Decency Act of 19969 ("CDA"), was struck
4. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, invalidated by Reno
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Child Online Protection Act, § 1403, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231
(Supp. 1999).

v.

5. "Spam" signifies unsolicited commercial email. See infra Part IV.
6. See Kim L. Rappaport, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in
Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom ofSpeech Online,
13 AM. U. INT'LL. REV. 765, 766-67, 788-90 (1998).
7. See Geremie R. Barme & Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China, WIRED, June 1997,
at 138, 147; Philip Shenon, 2-Edged Sword: Asian Regimes on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 1995, at 1.
8. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (Supp. 1999).
9. Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, invalidated by Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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down by the Supreme Court in 1997.10 Now two years later, a federal
district court in Philadelphia has enjoined enforcement of COPA.11
And if the ACLU succeeds in striking this statute, Congress no doubt
will be at it again. Among the headaches of Y2K will be another
CDA; and among the more significant (if repetitive) cases of 2001 will
be ACLU v. [the next attorney general].
Congress may never pass a statute that satisfies the Court,12 but we
think it could. There exists a type of "decency act," which we sketch
here, that would pass constitutional muster. That act is not COPA.
To see why this "decency act" would be constitutional where COPA
was not, and to understand this alternative act, requires a broader
view. It requires an analysis that makes clear the different values at
stake.
Our aim in this essay is to provide just such a perspective. We of
fer in Part I a model of mandated access control that will clarify the
issues in play. While this model will help resolve the constitutional
questions raised by COPA, it will also help see the issues that man
dated access controls present more generally. Given that different ju
risdictions will want different restrictions, and given that those restric
tions would be differentially costly, we provide in Part II a map of the
different architectures and assignments of responsibility that might ef
fect these restrictions. We then consider the trade-offs among these
alternatives - both generally, and in particular in the American con
text.
This approach is a type of sensitivity analysis. Regulation, in the
view that we take of it here, is a function of both law and the architec
tures of the Internet within which law must function. By "architec
tures" we mean (a) the Internet's technical protocols (for example,
TCP/IP), (b) its standards and standard applications (for example,
browsers or a digital certificate standard), and (c) its entrenched struc
tures of governance and social patterns of usage that themselves are
not easily changed - or at least not without coordinated action by
many parties. These architectures are not fixed. They change, partly
in response to both direct and indirect regulation by law. Thus in Part
II we ask first how access can be controlled given the existing array of
legal and architectural constraints. We then consider how changes in
the current array might yield a different mix of costs and benefits.
We evaluate the various outcomes of these different legal and ar
chitectural choices along four separate dimensions. For any particular
mix, we consider, first, the effectiveness at controlling access; second,
10. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
11. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
12. A cynic might believe that this repetition is no accident. After all, Congress gets
rewarded for what it passes, not what sticks. Protecting kids is great politics. Why do it only
once, the cynic might ask, when one can do it every two years?
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the cost to participants, whether sender, receiver, or intermediary;
third, the costs to a system of "free speech" that such access controls
impose; and fourth, other second-order effects, including in particular
how different architectures might enable other regulation, beyond the
specific access control that a given change was designed to enable.
For concreteness, we will focus on sexually explicit speech. We
pick this type of speech because, in the American context at least,
there exist at least two permissible levels of regulation for such speech.
Some sexually explicit speech is prohibited generally (obscene speech,
child porn); some sexually explicit speech is prohibited only to minors
(speech that is "harmful to minors"); and the balance of sexually ex
plicit speech is permitted to everyone.13 This range of regulations will
therefore illustrate the more general problem of access control across
jurisdictions.
We then apply our model to COPA. COPA has a significantly
narrower reach than the original CDA. Although Congress was, we
believe, responsive to the Supreme Court's opinion in Reno, there is a
structural feature of COPA that still renders it unconstitutional, at
least when compared to a second possible statute that would have
achieved Congress's legitimate end.14 Those attacking COPA are not
in a position to suggest this alternative, because they believe that pri
vate regulation is better than any law. But while we agree that private
regulation may be better than COPA, we will suggest that private
regulation may be more costly for free speech interests than the alter
native regulation that we sketch here.
Part III focuses on this cost differential. There we consider the
unintended consequences of the various regulatory strategies pro
posed. We argue that any reckoning of the costs of mandated access
control must consider these secondary costs (and benefits) as well. In
our view, these have been ignored in the debate so far. Yet arguably,
they will be the most significant. Long after the "problem" of "inde
cent speech" is solved, the consequences of our choices to deal with
indecent speech - these secondary effects - will continue to influ
ence the culture of the Net. Legal and policy analyses would do well
to account in the first place for these secondary effects.
The last section, Part IV, applies the same model to efforts to con
trol "unsolicited commercial email," or "spam." The motivation for
spam control differs from the reasons for controlling "indecency."
Spam control protects recipients from unwanted information pushed
into their mailboxes rather than preventing them from pulling infor
mation that they want. Our model and analysis, however, apply
equally well to controlling spam, and shed light on the likely effective-

13. See the cases cited in Lessig, supra note 1, at 638 nn.26 & 27.
14. We describe this model below in Section II.D. Congress was aware of this alterna
tive. See 144 CONG. REC. S12795 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (comments of Sen. Leahy).
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ness and side effects of various legislative and architectural changes
that have been proposed.
I.

A MODEL OF ACCESS CONTROL
A.

Elements

In our model of mandated access control ("MAC"), we consider
three relevant actors - a sender, a recipient, and an intermediary.
The sender makes available the relevant speech; the recipient gets ac
cess to the relevant speech; and an intermediary is an entity that
stands between the two. As these definitions suggest, nothing in our
description hangs upon whether the sender actually sends material to
the recipient, or upon the mode with which the recipient gains access.
These actors, we will assume, know different things about the
speech that is to be regulated. We assume the sender knows about the
contents of the item being sent. We assume the recipient has informa
tion about her own identity and residence. And finally we assume the
intermediary has information neither about the content, nor about
who the recipient is or where she resides. Obviously, these assump
tions are not necessary. A sender might not have knowledge about
the speech she makes available; and a recipient may not know where
or who she is. But we assume a general case.
Given this mix of knowledge, a government effects mandated ac
cess control through four separate steps. It first defines which transac
tions are illegal, where "transaction" means the exchange of speech of
a certain kind between two kinds of individuals. Second, it assigns re
sponsibility to one or more actors to effect that restriction. Third, it
creates a regime to detect when assigned responsibilities are violated.
And fourth, it sets punishments for these violations. In the balance of
this Part, we sketch issues relevant to each of these elements of a
regulatory regime, and we conduct, for each element, a sensitivity
analysis.
B.

Step One: Defining Blocked Exchanges

A regulatory regime first defines a set of illegal transactions, or
"blocked exchanges." The criteria for deciding whether an exchange
is blocked include: (1) the type of speech item exchanged ("I''); (2)
the recipient ("R"); and (3) the rules of the recipient's jurisdiction
("l"). We can state this relation as follows:
(a) Blocked Exchange:
B(l, R, J) =(Y, NJ
Where I=item type, R=recipient type, and J =jurisdiction type. B(x,y,z) is a function
determining whether exchange of the speech item is blocked. If the exchange is
blocked, the function yields Y; if the exchange is not blocked, the function yields N.
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Stated alternatively, a blocked exchange equates with access to a given
item type, by a given individual within a given jurisdiction, that the law
deems illegal.
Within this model, there may be "floor" recipients and "floor" ju
risdictions. In the specific context of sexually explicit speech within
American jurisdictions, children represent a type of floor recipient
(anything permitted to children is permitted to adults as well), and a
Bible Belt small town may be a floor jurisdiction (anything permitted
there would be permissible everywhere). More formally, with J1 de
noting a floor jurisdiction:
(b) Floor Recipient.
For all!, J: B(I, child,]) =Nimplies for allR, B(I, R, J) =N
(c) Floor Jurisdiction.
For all!, R: B(I, R, J) =Nimplies for all], B(I, R, J) =N
The two floors can be combined. Anything that the law permits to
children in a floor jurisdiction it will permit to everyone in every juris
diction:
(d) Floor recipient and
For all I: B(I, child, l) =Nimplies for all J and R,
jurisdiction.
B(I, R, J) =N
In the general case, either the sender's or the recipient's jurisdic
tion may determine that an exchange is blocked. United States laws
regulating cryptography, for example, restrict a sender's right to send
certain encryption-related material to another jurisdiction; French
cryptography laws regulate a receiver's right to receive such material.
For simplicity, however, we will focus only on exchanges blocked by
the recipient jurisdiction. Our analysis would apply with equal force if
the exchange were blocked in the sender's jurisdiction because, aside
from the effect on enforcement, the factors analyzed here do not de
pend on whose jurisdiction regulates.
A jurisdiction,15 on this model of blocked transactions, may specify
that a particular transaction must be blocked in at least two different
ways:
1. The jurisdiction might publish criteria defining what must be
blocked, but require a judgment by the parties about how to
apply that criteria. The jurisdiction may or may not then hold
parties responsible for correctly making such judgments prior
to a determination by the regulating jurisdiction.
2. The jurisdiction might classify specific items as acceptable or
blocked for particular recipient types, or, alternatively, create a
list of prohibited speech. Determinations of acceptability could
occur through a judicial or administrative process, or the juris
diction could delegate its authority to an independent rating

15. There is an important ambiguity in the concept of "jurisdiction" that we ignore here.
Some rules depend upon where the person acts, rather than where the person is a citizen. If
the drinking age in one state is 21, it does not matter that in the jurisdiction where X comes
from, the drinking age is 18. But some rules may depend upon where someone comes from.
We do not distinguish those cases in this version of the argument.
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service.16 A jurisdiction could even rely on a computer program
to provide an initial classification of the speech at issue, and
publish that classification as a preclearance, perhaps with a
stipulation that the initial classification might be changed in the
future after human review.
In the American context, jurisdictions ordinarily follow the procedure
of case (1). If a jurisdiction follows case (2), publishing a list of
blocked items for a given recipient type, then the list of items must,
ordinarily, be judicially specified.17 If, however, the lists are used on a
voluntary basis for preclearance of acceptable items, nonjudicial de
terminations might be acceptable, a possibility we will analyze in Part
II.
C.

Step Two: Assignments ofResponsibility

In the second step the regulator must define how best to allocate
responsibility among actors to assure that access is controlled. In ad
dition to the sender and recipient, it will sometimes be useful to distin
guish among intermediaries. Internet Access Providers, such as AOL
or AT&T WorldNet, serve as intermediaries closest to the senders and
recipients. Internet backbone providers, such as WorldCom and
Sprint, carry data between access providers. Responsibility for con
trolling access could be assigned either exclusively to one actor or
jointly to any combination. We analyze only exclusive assignments of
responsibility for blocking, as opposed to shared responsibility, though
we do consider requiring other parties to provide information to the
blocking party.
By hypothesis, no party knows enough to determine whether a
particular exchange should be blocked.18 The law must therefore cre
ate an incentive for parties to produce sufficient information to de
termine whether access should be blocked.

16. An example would be Cyber Patrol's CyberNOT list. See Cyber Patrol Main Page
(visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com/>.
17. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 {1972), which held that an injunc
tion could be used so long as adequate procedures to determine obscenity had been used.
This would probably not be permitted absent a judicial finding. See Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738-39 (1970).
18. Again, the sender does not know the recipient; the recipient does not know the con
tent of the item; the intermediary does not know either. See supra Section I.A. This does
not mean that there would not be extreme, and therefore easy, cases. The speaker would
certainly know, therefore, whether some kinds of speech were highly likely to be permitted.
Banalities about the weather constitute fairly safe speech acts anywhere; sadistic child porn
is fairly unsafe in most jurisdictions.
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The law ordinarily creates incentives through property or liability
regimes. While a property regime in this area seems conceivable,19 we
focus here on a liability regime. The law can create an incentive to
produce the information necessary to determine whether an exchange
should be blocked by assigning liability to an actor for failing to block
properly a transaction,20 or by setting a default rule about whether to
block properly a transaction when there is uncertainty.21
We consider two such defaults.22 Under the first default, the
sender incurs liability if she enters a transaction without reliable indi
cators that the transaction was in fact legal, and that transaction is
later determined to be illegal. We call this the "prohibited unless
permitted" rule. Because liability turns on the steps taken to comply
with the law, it is distinct from a prior restraint.23
Under the second rule, the sender incurs liability only if she enters
a transaction in the face of indicators that the transaction was in fact
illegal, and that transaction is later determined to be illegal. We call
this the "permitted unless prohibited" rule, and it is equivalent to a
rule punishing a specific intent to violate the law.24 One modification
of this second rule would hold the sender responsible if the sender
should have known that the transaction was illegal. This would com-

19. For an excellent analysis of a property regime for dealing with access control, see
Developments in the Law - The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1634-57
(1999).
20. See infra Part II.
21. By "uncertainty" we mean simply not having a given type of information - for ex
ample, information about the jurisdiction from which a receiver comes.
22. We do not claim at this point that either default would, for all types of speech, be
constitutional under the U.S. Constitution. Nor do we speak about the burdens of proof un
der a particular statute. We assume throughout that the state bears the burden for all ele
ments of the charge. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 {1959) {finding it unconstitutional
to hold a bookseller criminally liable regardless of the bookseller's knowledge of the ob·
scene contents of books sold). Rather than claim what is constitutionally possible, our de
faults help clarify the relationship between the proscription and uncertainty. Like Schauer's
article, our objective is to further explore this relationship, and the constitutional implica
tions of uncertainty. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unravel
ing the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 725-29 {1978).
23. It is distinct because there exists no requirement to not send, but rather simply a
punishment for sending without indication that the sending is legal. We concede this is a
fine line, but with our defaults we aim, as we have explained above, not so much to limn the
contours of American constitutionalism, but to understand the relationship between these
rules and uncertainty.
24. The Model Penal Code equates specific intent with "acting knowingly." The rele
vant section reads:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain
that his conduct will cause such a result.

MODELPENAL CODE § 2.02(2){b) {1962).
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port with a negligence standard, and we consider this alternative
where relevant in the analysis below.25
These default rules will have significant consequences for behavior
if there is systematic uncertainty about either the nature of Internet
content or the character of Internet users (as of course there is). In
cases of uncertainty, the "prohibited unless permitted" rule will be
overbroad (it will block more speech than the state has a legitimate
interest in blocking), while the "permitted unless prohibited" rule will
be ineffective (since there will be insufficient incentive to discover the
relevant information about what speech should be blocked).26 Thus in
the face of uncertainty, the default rule will be important, especially if
one default is constitutionally compelled.
We will focus on changes in the architecture that might reduce the
uncertainty. Stated abstractly, these changes will either tag speech, or
tag people. If speech is tagged, then an intermediary or recipient can
more easily determine item types and block accordingly; if people are
tagged, then an intermediary or sender can more easily identify recipi
ent and jurisdiction types and block accordingly.

D.

Steps Three and Four: Monitoring and Enforcement

In the final two steps the regulator must first devise schemes for
monitoring compliance and, second, implement schemes of enforce
ment. In both cases where the target of regulation sits, relative to the
regulating regime, is an important factor in selecting among regulatory
regimes. And in the case of monitoring, the technology used to effect
the access control will significantly alter the costs of monitoring. Some
technologies, that is, would be open for an automated and random
verification; others would not.
The major issues for enforcement all involve the question of
whether the regulating jurisdictions can easily, or cheaply, reach the
target of enforcement. We assume there are more receivers than
senders, so one might believe targeting senders would be cheaper than
targeting receivers. This, however, becomes complicated when the
sender operates from outside the regulating jurisdiction, making the
sender sometimes legally, or at least practically, beyond the reach of
the regulating jurisdiction. The cost of enforcement against these ali
ens may make it cheaper to enforce a rule against receivers than send
ers.
Whether more receivers or listeners exist, however, there are cer
tainly fewer intermediaries than either. Intermediaries, as we discuss

25. See infra Section II.A.
26. The REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §282 (1965) defines negligence as "con
duct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm."
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below, could be good targets of regulation, even though they possess
even less information than either the sender or receiver. Again, the
savings in enforcing a rule against them may outweigh the cost of their
obtaining the necessary information. Thus from a social cost perspec
tive, making them liable could be efficient.27
II.

ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY

We now consider the consequences, under each of our two default
rules, of allocating responsibility among our three actors - first to the
sender, then to the recipient, and finally, to the intermediary. Within
each allocation, we also consider how changes in existing law and
Internet architecture might more efficiently achieve the aim of access
control - more control at less free speech cost. This comprises our
"sensitivity analysis" within each allocation. Finally, at the end of this
Section, we consider a "mixed" strategy for the special case of "inde
cent speech" and children.
A.

Sender Responsible for Blocking Access

Our first rule would make the sender responsible for controlling
access. To comply with this rule, the sender must determine both the
law of the jurisdiction of the recipient and, depending upon that law,
certain characteristics of the recipient. Material considered "harmful
to minors" present the obvious case, because many states require that
providers of such material keep it from kids.28 But the rule anticipates
more general possibilities: rules regulating SEC filings, for example,
make the content of that filing depend upon whether the reader is or is
not a U.S. citizen.
Under the present Internet architecture, both determinations en
tail high costs. There is no simple way to identify the jurisdiction
within which the recipient resides,29 and no cheap way to be certain of

27. Our conclusion, however, will be that the social costs of enabling blocking by inter
mediaries are in fact quite high. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60.
28. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 887 & n.2 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
29. A web server, for example, knows the IP address of the client computer that re
quests a web page, but usually knows little else about the recipient. An IP address does not
readily identify a geographic location, because the administrative practices surrounding IP
address allocation have not been based solely on geography. By analogy with the telephone
numbering system, IP addresses have been allocated more like 800-numbers than like the
numbers in regular area codes. Moreover, there is currently no single up-to-date database
indicating the location of the computer using each IP address. (In practice, to facilitate
routing, address allocations do roughly follow geography, which means that such a database
might not be too unwieldy if it were assembled.) An IP address does not even uniquely
identify a recipient computer, since dial-up connections through an Internet service provider
typically are assigned a different address each time they dial.
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characteristics of the individual. The rule would therefore be quite
costly to a speaker - unconstitutionally costly, according to Reno v.
ACLU, though differently costly under each of our two default rules.
Under the "prohibited unless permitted" rule, the cost falls on
"free speech" interests. The burden of determining eligibility will
likely create a significant chill on the speaker's speech.30 The sender
would have to take steps outside of the architecture of the Net to de
termine where a recipient is - by verifying an address, for example,
or by using an area code on a telephone number as a proxy for the lo
cation. And the sender would need to rely upon proxies from creden
tials (such as a credit card) to guess whether the individual is of a
proper age or not.
The United States Supreme Court has permitted this regime in the
context of obscenity, where the sender must determine both the juris
diction relevant for the recipient and the law of that jurisdiction.31 It
has not directly addressed the same question in the context of speech
"harmful to minors" on the Internet, where the sender must deter
mine, in addition to the jurisdictional information, the age of the re
cipient. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court did cite the burden of verifica
tion as one reason that the CDA's "indecency" provision was
constitutionally suspect.32 But Reno did not consider the "harmful to
minors" standard - or, as described by some, the obscene-as-to
minors standard33 - and the Supreme Court has not clearly indicated
that the test would be different.
If, on the other hand, the rule is "permitted unless prohibited," the
cost lies in the effectiveness of the regulation. Under this rule, the ex
isting architecture would make any access control ineffective. While
in real space, certain facts about an individual are unavoidably self
authenticating (a ten-year-old boy does not look much like a twenty
year-old man), in cyberspace, such facts are not. To determine either
the jurisdiction or the age of the recipient requires affirmative steps by
the sender. If no obligation to take such steps exists, or if no require30. Though the use of the word has become quite general, we attempt in this essay to
follow Schauer's definition of "chill," which refers "only to those examples of deterrence
which result from the indirect governmental restriction of protected expression." Schauer,
supra note 22, at 693.
31.

See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-06 (1974).

32

Reno v. ACLU,

521 U.S. at 876.

33. See, e.g., Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780F.2d 1389,
1394 (8th Cir. 1986); see also M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721F.2d 1281, 1287-91, 1295 (10th
Cir. 1983) (upholding a requirement that obscene-as-to-minors magazines be placed in
"blinder racks"). Under Ginsberg, "minors may constitutionally be denied access to mate
rial that is obscene as to minors," but adults may not. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 895
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968)). Material is obscene as to minors if it is patently offen
sive, appeals to minors' prurient interest, and completely lacks socially redeeming value for
minors. See id.
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ment exists to block unless such steps are taken, then the rule will not
effect the intended access control.
The existing architecture of the Internet therefore creates a great
burden for the sender if the default is "prohibited unless permitted,''
and it defeats access control if the default is "permitted unless prohib
ited."

1.

Sensitivity

Some of the burden on the sender could be reduced by architec
tural and legal changes. In this Section we describe four, and consider
the potential costs and benefits of each.
The first two changes involve ways to identify more cheaply facts
about the recipient. The two facts unknown by the sender are the ju
risdiction of the recipient, and characteristics of the recipient (that she
is, for example, over eighteen). The changes described here would fa
cilitate the sender knowing both facts at a relatively cheap cost.
The first technique relies on digital certificates.34 In the standard
model of certificates, certificates identify who someone is. They are
digital objects cryptographically signed by a certificate authority, a
widely trusted entity that verifies an individual or organizational iden
tity before issuing a certificate. The dominant use of such certificates
today is to certify the identity of the holder.35 This is the model, for
example, of the VeriSign Digital ID, which VeriSign, one of the best
known certificate authorities on the Internet, describes as a "driver['s]
license[] for the Internet."36
But there is no reason that the same technology could not be used
to certify facts about the holder - or, more generally, to certify any
assertion made by the signer. In our case, a signing certificate author
ity could then certify that Xis from Massachusetts, and that Xis over
the age of eighteen, without identifying who X is.37 Senders would
then examine these certificates before granting access to regulable
speech. Access would then be granted without a cumbersome system
of passwords or IDs.

34. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in
Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49 (1996) (describing digital certification techniques).
35. See id. at 58-62.
36. See VeriSign Digital ID Center (visited Sept. 16, 1999) <http://www.verisign.com/
client/index.html>.
37. David Chaum was an early proponent of such characteristics certificates rather than
identity certificates. See David Chaum, Security Without Identification: Transaction Systems
to Make Big Brother Obsolete, 28 COMM. ACM 1030 (1985).
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We can call this a "credentialling" solution.38 It requires that the
sender make certain judgments about the speech at stake; but it allows '
the sender to rely upon representations about the jurisdiction and the
recipient that are necessary to determine whether an exchange is or is
not blocked.
Under a "prohibited unless permitted" regime, access would be
blocked except to those who could show that they carry the proper
credentials. In the case of "harmful to minors" speech, the credential
would be an adult ID indicating that the recipient is over eighteen.
Recipients interested in receiving restricted materials will have an in
centive to show such credentials. All else being equal, certificates
would lower the cost of such a showing, and therefore reduce the bur
den, and hence chill, of the access control regime. Moreover, the bur
den on individuals under such a regime would be lower than under a
regime where they must show a credit card or other form of identifica
tion. The cost of a certificate should be less than the cost of a card,
and the possibilities for anonymity should be greater.
While no legal mandate on recipients would be needed to encour
age showing age or jurisdiction certificates under a "prohibited unless
permitted" regime, sanctions would be needed to reduce fraudulent
use of certificates. If, for example, it were easy to obtain an anony
mous adult-ID certificate, one might imagine a black market emerg
ing, with children acquiring certificates from adult intermediaries.
This potentiality creates a practical limitation on any regime where a
credential grants access, since it creates an incentive to construct a
false credential. One way to limit the transferability of anonymous
certificates would be to include an IP address in the certificate, so that
it could only be used with a single computer, or for the duration of a
single dial-up connection if an access provider assigns different ad
dresses for each dial-up session. (Each computer on the Internet has a
numeric identifier, called an IP address.) Another technique for lim
iting transfers would be to make the certificates traceable, so that if
abuse is detected, the identity of the original acquirer could be re
vealed, and that person could be punished.
Alternatively, widespread use of digital certificates could also im
prove the effectiveness of a "permitted unless prohibited" regime, by
providing senders with enough information to block correctly ex
changes that would otherwise have been permitted by default.39
To minimize the burden of this rule, the rule could require that the
recipient provide the certificate only if the server asks, and the server

38. Note that even though the technology for this solution is already in place, we refer to
it as a possible architectural change because a widespread change in social practices would
be necessary for the technology to be used in this way.
39. One version of this regime would have recipients provide child-IDs, which we dis
cuss below when considering COPA. See infra Section II.D.
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would be required to ask only if the material is illegal in at least one
jurisdiction. This regime would still somewhat burden those recipients
living in jurisdictions where the speech was wholly legal; its viability
would rest then upon the significance of that burden.40 Alternatively,
the rule could require that intermediaries provide or assure that users
have valid certificates. In this case, the appropriate intermediaries
would be the Internet Access Providers who serve recipients. If the
state requires such intermediaries to assure the supply of certificates,
then the costs of monitoring and compliance might be lower than if
the same role were performed by the state. The intermediary has an
advantage not in executing the primary conduct - certainly receivers
stand in a better position to certify than intermediaries - but in as
suring that the primary conduct is properly regulated.
A second architectural change to help the sender identify the re
cipient's jurisdiction would be an IP map - a table that would give a
rough approximation of the location of the recipient's computer.41 No
doubt the map could not be perfect, and senders or recipients could
use proxies to escape the consequences of the map. But in the main,
the map might sufficiently segregate restrictive jurisdictions from non
restrictive ones.
An IP map would provide benefits over a certificate system. Un
der the "prohibited unless permitted" regime, an IP map may burden
speech even less than the certificate regime, since the cost to the re
cipient of this form of identification is zero, and the processing costs to
the server would be lower than processing a certificate. The "permit
ted unless prohibited" regime becomes more effective as well, since
n.ow the sender has an assured way of knowing the jurisdiction into
which the material is being sent, though not information about the re
cipient's age or other characteristics.
But there are important social costs associated with this IP-to
geography mapping that flow from its generality. Since jurisdiction
identification would be determinable with any IP transaction, the re
gime would effect jurisdiction identification independent of the kind
of speech being accessed. This raises obvious privacy concerns, which
might be mitigated by structures that would limit the use of the map-

40. Another possibility would be for the server to send a request of the form "if you are
in jurisdiction X or Y and you are under 18, please provide a child ID," which would further
reduce the burden of the system.
41. Currently, the InterNIC maintains a database of the assignations of IP addresses to
organizations. This database is public, and a copy of it may be queried from any computer
on the Internet Unfortunately, some entries in the database are incomplete or out of date,
and they do not necessarily identify the location of computers using the IP addresses. It has
been suggested, however, that such a database be used as a starting point for developing an
IP to jurisdiction mapping. See Philip McCrea et al., Blocking Content on the Internet: A
Technical Perspective, app. 5 (visited Sept. 16, 1999) <http://www.noie.gov.au/>.
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ping for specific purposes. But for obvious reasons, it would be diffi
cult to limit the use of this information.
The final two architectural changes would aid senders in classifying
their speech according to the categories of various jurisdictions. The
first is an automated preclearance technology. While we presume that
the sender knows about its speech, the sender may not understand the
classification scheme of every legal jurisdiction. Preclearance of the
sender's materials can reduce or eliminate the uncertainty. Judicial
preclearance would entail high costs. Determinations could be per
formed more cheaply, however, by third parties or even computer
programs, but there would inevitably be some errors when compared
with the gold standard of judicial determinations. Thus, in the United
States at least, a judicial determination is required to block exchanges
proactively.42
A voluntary preclearance regime, however, might be acceptable,
even with nonjudicial determinations. Suppose that the government
promised not to prosecute a sender for exchanges that had been pre
cleared as acceptable. Uncertainty would remain about other items.
It would seem initially that such a voluntary regime would be speech
enhancing. On the margin, if a speaker could be certain that her
speech were permissible, she would be more likely to utter it than if
she faced the risk that it would be illegal. But some who have consid
ered the matter believe that if this voluntary regime became effec
tively mandatory, and if speech that did not appear on a preclearance
list thus became effectively restricted, such a list would become consti
tutionally suspect.43 The Constitution notwithstanding, we believe that
the voluntary regime's overall effect is unclear: preclearance could
lead to less chilling of speech (if it is clearer what is prohibited and
what is not) but to more control of speech (if it results in greater
prosecution).
A second way to reduce uncertainty about how to classify items
according to particular jurisdictions' categories would be a thesaurus
that relates the categories of different jurisdictions. Thus, if the sender
is able to classify an item according to one jurisdiction's categories, it
could infer the classification in some other jurisdictions. For example,
it may be that anything classified as child pornography in jurisdiction
A would be classified as obscene in jurisdiction B, though the converse
inference might not hold. The thesaurus functions as a more complex

42 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1972).
43. See Schauer, supra note 22, at 725-29. The closest case is perhaps Bantam Books v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), where the Court invalidated a "blacklist" Commission. The
preclearance idea is not quite a blacklist - the result of the submission would be a promise
not to prosecute, not a determination that the material was "obscene." Again, however, we
concede that the line is a difficult one to sustain.
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version of the base jurisdiction model that we described in equation
(c).44
B.

Recipient Responsible for Not Taking Access

Our second rule would make the recipient responsible for illegal
transactions - targeting the buyer, that is, rather than the seller. Un
der this rule, then, it is the recipient who incurs liability if an improper
transaction occurs.
This rule has some advantages over the sender-responsible rule the recipient, for example, may be in a better position to know about
the law of its jurisdiction, and about its own recipient type. But obvi
ous disadvantages exist as well. The recipient stands in a worse posi
tion, relative to the sender, to know about the kind of information that
the sender is making available. While a sender may find it burden
some to classify its speech according to any given jurisdiction's catego
ries, at least the sender begins with knowledge about the content of
the speech at issue.45 The receiver does not. This lack of knowledge
means that a recipient cannot determine the legality of an exchange
until after the exchange has occurred. Thus, under a "prohibited un
less permitted" rule, the receiver risks liabilitt6 in the very act of de
termining whether a particular exchange complies with the law. And
under the "permitted unless prohibited" rule, restrictions would likely
be completely ineffective because the recipient would have a signifi
cantly reduced incentive to accurately assess the legality of the ex
change.
A second problem with placing liability on the receiver results
from the costs of classification. Because receivers outnumber senders,
this rule shifts the cost of classification to the many, rather than to the
few. This cost shift will result in either too much or too little blocking.
For those who have a strong interest in blocking certain speech, the
costs of classification will push the classifier to an overly conservative
strategy. For those who have little interest in blocking certain speech,
the costs would likely push the classifier not to classify at all.
Finally, putting the responsibility on the receiver may increase the
costs of enforcement. Receivers are ordinarily individuals, and there
fore more difficult to target. Whether this would increase the cost of
44. See supra Section I.B.
45. It would be different, of course, if the sender were considered as a bookstore, with
out knowledge, or any simple way to get knowledge, about the content of its books. See
Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). We would con
sider such a "sender" to be an intermediary in our analysis.
46. This depends upon the level of knowledge required for someone to be guilty under
such a provision. If the statute were criminal, the knowledge requirement would be quite
strong, so inadvertent liability would not be possible. But for a lesser prohibition, the
knowledge requirement may be less.
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enforcement generally, of course, depends upon whether the alterna
tive targets - senders or intermediaries - are more easily regulated.
If they operate primarily from outside the regulating jurisdiction, then
regulating recipients may be less costly than regulating senders or in
termediaries.

1.

Sensitivity

A recipient-responsible rule could be made less costly if there were
cheaper ways to identify the speech before the transaction. Labels or
content rating is an obvious solution here. Two sorts of labeling are
possible. One we have already described - prescreening47 - and
here the same techniques for reducing the costs of preclearance would
apply, including the use of automatic text classification and delegation
of the preclearance powers to an independent third-party rater. As we
mentioned before, however, there remains a concern about the consti
tutionality of even a voluntary preclearance regime.48 In the American
context, despite the reduction in uncertainty, this might constitute a
prohibited regulatory change.
The other labeling solution is to rely on senders to label their own
materials. The labels might directly indicate whether the item is per
mitted or prohibited to recipients of various ages in particular jurisdic
tions, or it could describe the item in detail (on dimensions such as
sex-related) sufficient to infer whether it should be blocked.49 This
solution simply inverts the certificate solution - here the sender of
fers a "certificate" upon which the recipient relies, while in the case
above, it was the recipient providing the certificate upon which the
sender would rely. The analysis is also analogous.
Under a "prohibited unless permitted" regime, the labels would
convey information that the speech is permitted (for example, no sex
or hate speech). Recipients would receive immunity if they in good
faith relied upon a sender's labels to determine that access is permit
ted. Senders would have a natural incentive to provide labels, since
they would allow more recipients to receive the speech, although pen
alties for inaccurate labels might be needed to prevent widespread
mislabeling. There would of course be a transition period, during
which only a small percentage of materials would carry self-rating la
bels, rendering most of the Net blocked under a strict "prohibited un
less permitted" rule. To minimize the transition period, authorities

47. See supra Section 11.A.1.
48. See id.
49. The labels could be expressed in PICS format, see generally Platform for Internet
Content Selection (last modified Aug. 4, 1999) <http://www.w3.org/PICS/>, or the new RDF
format, see generally Resource Description Framework (last modified Aug. 9, 1999)
<http://www.w3.org/RDF>, and distributed along with the items.

412

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:395

might publicize well in advance the imposition of such a regime, in the
hopes that most senders would label before the filtering took effect. It
is not clear how effective such advance publicity would be, and there
would probably be a great public outcry during the transition period,
perhaps enough to cause a reversal of the regulation.
Under a "permitted unless prohibited" regime, the labels would
indicate that access to an item was prohibited (to some groups in some
jurisdictions). The obvious problem here is that the sender would
have little incentive to label, since that could only reduce legal access.so
To bolster the effectiveness of this regime, a government might re
quire senders to provide labels. This may raise a constitutional ques
tion in the United States if labels were considered compelled speech.st
Some have argued that they would not,52 but we believe this is a close
question. To reduce the cost to senders of labeling, a government
might subsidize third-party ratings or itself produce suggested ratings.
In the United States, its ratings could not be treated as definitive53 in
such a system, but they may provide an aid to senders in self-labeling.
The burden of labels might be minimized by simply requiring la
bels only where speech is potentially regulable (comparable to re
quiring that people up to the age of twenty-six carry IDs to purchase
cigarettes, even though the prohibition reaches only those eighteen
and under). Even here, however, the requirement raises difficult
questions, since it would require speech by the sender in the form of a
label even when the underlying speech is clearly legal in the receiving
jurisdiction. Thus the most restrictive jurisdiction would in effect de
termine whether the speaker must label.

50. If many people voluntarily adopted a "prohibited unless permitted" filter, then the
market demand for labels might sufficiently encourage sender self-labeling, even if the state
mandated only the less strict "permitted unless prohibited" regime. For example, consumers
might turn on the facilities in Microsoft's Internet Explorer (version 3 and higher) or Net
scape Navigator (version 4.5) to voluntarily block access based on senders' PICS-formatted
self-labels.
51. The "compelled speech" doctrine forbids the government from forcing individuals to
assert the views of the government.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 804-06 (2d ed. 1988) and the cases cited therein.
52 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755,
777-98 (1999).
53. The government's own ratings are not always determinative of whether speech was
delivered or not, absent a judicial finding. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't 397
U.S. 728, 738-39 (1970). To force individuals to label their content would, we believe, often
require them to make judgments about the character of the material they were labeling. But
the labels in this context are not objective, nor independent of a viewpoint about the nature
of the material. To have to assert the character of the material, then, can be to require indi
viduals to make what is in essence a political statement. If a newspaper cannot be forced to
publish a story it does not otherwise want to print, see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), then neither should a web site be forced to publish a story
about itself (i.e., that it carries materials of type X) that it does not othenvise want to print.
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As with recipient certificates, the responsibility for assuring a sup
ply of sender labels might be assigned to intermediaries, in this case to
the sender's Internet Access Provider. One important asymmetry ex
ists, however. While age and jurisdiction are objective properties that
one might reasonably expect an access provider to verify, correct as
signment of rating labels to items will involve subjective judgements.
One intermediate form of responsibility might be to require an access
provider to assure the availability of some sender self-label, but to
make only the sender and not the access provider responsible for any
inaccuracies in the label.
There is a practical enforcement problem with mandating that
senders provide labels. Just as it may be difficult to enforce blocking
requirements across jurisdictional boundaries, it may be difficult for
authorities in one jurisdiction to enforce a labeling requirement in an
other.
C.

Intermediary Responsible for Blocking

We have assumed that the intermediary possesses information
about neither the recipient nor the item the sender would send. It
might therefore seem odd to consider the intermediary as a possibly
responsible actor.
But intermediaries provide a cheap target of regulation. Fewer of
them exist than either receivers or senders, and they are typically
more stable, or harder to move. Just as the government can more eas
ily regulate telephone companies than it can telephone users, it would
be easier for the government to set requirements on intermediaries,
which intermediaries could then enforce upon their customers. More
importantly, because intermediaries have an interest in reducing the
cost of compliance, regulating intermediaries will more likely catalyze
innovation in compliance methods.
In addition to a lack of information, intermediaries may have lim
ited capabilities for implementing blocks. Blocking can either be im
plemented at the application layer (for example, web page requests)
or at the network layer (for example, individual packets). Whereas
application layer blocking allows tailored blocking of URLs,54 network
layer blocks are of necessity much cruder: only the sender's and re
ceiver's IP addresses and the port number (a rough indicator of
whether the connection is being used for a web transfer, email, or
something else) are available. Thus, a network layer block can either
block all web requests to a particular IP address, or none of them.ss
54. A URL identifies both a computer to connect to and a path or file name to request.
Thus, URL blocking enables some files from a Web server to be blocked, while others are
not blocked.
55. For a more complete description of application layer and network layer blocking,
see McCrea et al., supra note 41, at 25-31.
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We consider two types of intermediaries.
One type provides
Internet access, such as Internet access or service providers, or even
employers and schools (for simplicity, we will refer generically to any
of these as an IAP). It is reasonable to assume that an end-user and
his or her IAP lie in the same jurisdiction.56 Many, but not all, IAPs
run proxy servers (and other application layer gateways) which inter
cept some kinds of Internet traffic. Most commonly, a web proxy at
an IAP will keep copies in a cache of frequently accessed web pages;
when a customer requests a cached page, the proxy sends it to the cus
tomer, without fetching it again from the sender's web server. Proxy
servers permit application layer blocking: requests for certain URLs
can be blocked. Moreover, an IAP may configure a firewall that
forces all requests to use the proxy server. This is done most fre
quently to enhance corporate security, by restricting the Internet traf
fic entering and leaving a corporation to only that which passes
through proxies. In those cases where an IAP does not employ proxy
servers, however, only cruder network layer blocking is possible.
The second type of intermediary is a backbone provider, which
carries data across jurisdictional boundaries. In practice, the IAP may
also run backbone services, but the services are conceptually distinct
because they have different technical filtering capabilities. Consider
the cross-jurisdiction transit point, the place in the backbone pro
vider's network where data crosses a jurisdictional boundary. Such
transit points do not normally employ proxy servers or other applica
tion layer gateways. Thus, only the cruder network layer blocking is
possible at cross-jurisdiction transit points, given the current Internet
architecture.
One final difficulty with blocking by intermediaries is that recipi
ents may find ways to bypass the blocks, especially if the senders co
operate. For example, the same prohibited document may be avail
able from several different URLs, so that a recipient can access one
even if the others are blocked. A technique known as tunneling,
·

where the contents of one packet are wrapped inside another packet,
may bypass a network layer block.57

1.

Sensitivity

These architectural features yield the conclusion that intermediar
ies cannot effectively control access, and given the fundamentality of
these features, it might seem unadvisable to make changes that would
increase their ability to control. Because intermediaries are also prac-

56. It would be possible, though expensive, to make an international phone call to ac
cess an IAP in another jurisdiction.
57. McCrea et al. detail these and other ways that senders and recipients might bypass
intermediaries' blocks. See McCrea et al., supra note 41, at 35, 37.

November 1999]

Zoning Speech

415

tically easier for a jurisdiction to regulate, however, we will consider
what changes might make this control possible.
A combination of the architectural changes discussed in previous
Sections could provide intermediaries with enough information to de
cide which exchanges to block. That is, information about item types
could come either from senders' labels or from preclearance lists pro
vided by jurisdictions. Information about recipient type could come
from certificates, and information about recipient jurisdiction could
come either from certificates or from a database lookup on the IP ad
dress.
One potential change in the architecture to facilitate the imple
mentation of blocking would be to require an application layer gate
way at IAPs or cross-jurisdiction transit points, and to require that all
customer traffic use these gateways (perhaps enforced via a firewall).
This would have high costs for Internet flexibility and operation. First,
it would be computationally expensive to assemble all packets into
messages at cross-jurisdictional transit points, especially for traffic
where there is no counteracting performance gain from caching. Sec
ond, messages may be encrypted for privacy or security purposes (for
example, in SSL connections) so that even at the application layer
only crude blocks based on sender and receiver address are possible.
Third, innovations that introduce new applications would be stifled,
since the application layer gateways would not initially know about
the new applications and hence would block them.58 The Internet's
current architecture has enabled experimentation and rapid deploy
ment of new applications (examples of applications that blossomed in
part as a result of this flexibility include the world wide web, push
services, and ICQ).59 One final cost might come in the form of reli
ability. It is relatively easy for a service provider to provide multiple
routers, so that a temporarily disabled router would not interrupt the
network layer service. It may be more costly to arrange for continued
service, however, when an application layer gateway is temporarily
disabled.60

58. Many corporate firewalls prevent employees from using experimental applications
that the corporate proxy or gateway is not configured to handle. See WILLIAM R.
CHEsWICK & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, FIREWALLS AND INTERNET SECURITY: REPELLING
THE WILY HACKER 76 (1994).
59. ICQ ("I Seek You") maintains a worldwide registry of users and their status (online,
busy, away, etc.), allowing users an easy way to keep track of friends and acquaintances.
The ICQ client software interacts with the registry updating a user's information and re
ceiving information about others on that user's "contact list." The ICQ client also acts as a
platform for chat and other message exchange between any two registered ICQ users. See
How to Use ICQ (visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.icq.com/icqtourl>; What Is ICQ? (vis
ited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.icq.com/products/whatisicq.html>.
60. See McCrea et al., supra note 41, at 31.
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D. Incentives for Tagging: "Kids" and COPA

Several of the regimes that we have considered depend on one
party providing information that another party uses to make its deci
sion to block. In these situations, the incentives of the information
provider depend on the default rule recognized by the regulator. A
blocking rule consistent with the "prohibited unless permitted" re
quirement creates an incentive (depending upon the regime) for re
cipients to provide certificates or for providers to label content. To
make the more permissive "permitted unless prohibited" regime work,
the regulator must threaten a sufficient punishment to induce the
needed tagging of information or recipients.
Regulations designed to protect kids, however, present a special
case.61 H one assumes that the parent is the relevant "recipient," then
unlike the general case, the recipient has an incentive to facilitate
blocking - if, indeed, blocking access is what that parent wants.62
Sender-based regulations could therefore follow a "permitted unless
prohibited" regime without restricting recipients who do not identify
themselves.
This difference has constitutional significance when one considers
regulations designed to block access to kids. For example, consider
one alternative to the regulation prescribed by Congress in CDA and
COPA - a regulation that would require senders to block only self
identifying kids, rather than regulation, such as CDA and COPA, that
required senders to block all receivers except those identified as
adults. The following hypothetical statute will suggest the idea.
1. Tamper-Resistant Kids-Mode Browsers ("KMB"). A "kids
mode" browser is a browser that signals to servers that the user
is a minor.63
2. Server Responsibility. When a server detects a kids-mode cli
ent, it shall (1) block that client from any material properly
61. They are a special case as well in that, relative to other mandated access control, the
content here is easier to identify. The model becomes far more complex if content such as
"defamatory" or "seditious" speech were considered. Likewise, the problem becomes far
more difficult if the recipient always has an incentive to evade the regulation. Regulating
"kids" is a special case because, at least sometimes, the parent has an interest in enforcing
the regulation.
62. The Court in Reno v. ACLU made it clear that the relevant question is whether par
ents are enabled in protecting kids, not whether the state is. 521 U.S. 844, 865 & n.31 (1997).
If a parent decides to give kids access, that decision cannot, for the range of speech being
discussed here, be overridden by the state.
63. Manufacturers of browsers and operating systems would presumably make it diffi
cult to modify the kids-mode configuration without a password. In practice, this would re
quire both that the kids-mode browser configuration not be easily changed, and that the op
erating system prevent installation of a fresh browser where the child could choose whether
to set it in kids-mode. Eventually, we might expect that the kids-mode setting would migrate
entirely into the operating system, with all browsers' behavior determined by the operating
system setting.
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deemed "harmful to minors," and (2) refrain from collecting
any identification data about the user, except data necessary to
process user requests (such as IP addresses). Any data col
lected shall be purged from the system within Xdays.
A browser "signals" to a server that its user is a minor in just the
way the browser now signals its browser type (for example, Microsoft
Internet Explorer or Netscape Communicator). Under the present ar
chitecture of the Net, the server "knows" what kind of browser you
use, the IP address you are browsing from, whether the client will ac
cept "cookies,"64 and the site you were viewing before you switched to
that site. The statute would simply tequire that if a browser signaled
that a user was a kid, then the server would not transmit material
"harmful to minors."
The statute imposes burdens, but burdens that are far less signifi
cant - practically and constitutionally - than the burdens of CDA or
COPA. The primary practical burden rests upon senders, who must
now discriminate on the basis of whether the client is a kid. Relative
to the existing constitutional baseline,65 it would be a trivial change for
servers to check for the existence of a kids-mode signal. The statute
does not directly burden software manufacturers, since it simply de
fines what a "kids-mode browser" is. By requiring servers to respect a
kids-tag, however, the statute creates an incentive for manufacturers
to provide such browsers to parents who would want this option.
Finally, one might believe the statute burdens parents practically
because they would have to activate the kids-mode browsing. But the
burden here is not legally significant; it merely consists in the difficulty
of checking a preference box and keeping a password secret. That, we
believe, is far less significant than the alternatives, say, of purchasing
and installing blocking software.
Compared with the burdens of COPA, we believe this regulation
would be constitutionally preferred. To see this, one must consider
the relative burden and effectiveness of the three statutes considered
here - COPA, CDA, and our proposed statute.66
COPA was modeled on the CDA, but regulates more narrowly
than the CDA. Like the CDA, it puts the burden on the speaker to

64. "Cookies are a general mechanism which server side [sic) connections (such as CGI
scripts) can use to both store and retrieve information on the client side of the connection.
The addition of a simple, persistent, client-side state significantly extends the capabilities of
Web-based client/server applications." Persistent Client State HTTP Cookie, Introduction
(visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html>. See gener
ally Cookie Central (visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.cookiecentral.com>.
65. Ginsberg implies that suppliers can be burdened to separate "harmful to minor"
speech from other speech. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-45 (1968).
66. This analysis follows the test created by the Supreme Court regarding the constitu
tionality of speech-restrictive regulations involving the protection of children. See infra note
80 and accompanying text.
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avoid speaking improperly to kids. But unlike the CDA, COPA puts
that burden on a narrow class of speakers, in a narrower zone of the
Internet. Under COPA, a commercial provider who "knowingly and
with knowledge of the character of the material . . . [uses the] World
Wide Web [to make] available to any minor . . . material that is harm
ful to minors" has committed a crime.67 The statute is thus narrower
in three ways: (1) in the breadth of speech regulated ("harmful to mi
nors" rather than "indecent"), (2) in the scope of speakers covered (it
does not reach noncommercial providers), and (3) in the range of the
Internet affected (it does not reach newsgroups or chat rooms).
Similarly, the defenses provid�d to a speaker by the statute impose
lesser burdens than those imposed by CDA. COPA's defenses are
broader than the defenses under CDA. Under section 231(c)(1) of
COPA, a provider has a defense if he
in good faith . . . restricted access by minors . . .

(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or
adult personal identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available
technology. 68
Section 231(c)(2) adds immunity from prosecution to this substantive
defense of section 231(c)(1). It provides that no action can be brought
against a provider who has in good faith attempted to implement one
of the defenses from section 231(c)(1).69
These defenses are thicker than those in CDA. First, the statute
envisions a form of identification not expressly recognized in the CDA
- the digital certificate, which as we have described could more
cheaply and with greater anonymity certify that someone is an adult.70
Second, the catchall category of technologies ("by any other reason
able measures that are feasible under available technology"71) is
broader than the parallel in the CDA. The CDA required that these
other technologies be "reasonable, effective, and appropriate."72 The
Supreme Court read this standard not as an ordinary tort standard,
but as an absolute effectiveness requirement.73 COPA's test, by con
trast, creates a traditional tort standard: a provider will have a defense
if he takes those steps reasonable in the circumstances, given the ex
isting state of technology, whether or not those steps are "effective."
67. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231{a){l) {Supp. 1999).
68. 47 U.S.C.A. § 23l{c){l).
69. See 41 U.S.C.A § 231{c)(2).
70. See supra Section I.A.
71. 47 U.S.C.A § 231(c){l).
72. 47 U.S.C.A § 223(e)(5){A).
73. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881-82 {1997).
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These differences evince what Congress purported to accomplish
- a response to the concerns of the Supreme Court in Reno v.
ACLU.14 It followed the outline sketched by Justice O'Connor's con
currence, an outline of what she thought a constitutional regulation
would be.75 If the Court is eager to reward legislative obedience, it
might well feel itself compelled to uphold Congress's latest effort.
But so far, lower courts have not been eager to reward Congress.
While acknowledging that COPA is less restrictive than CDA, they
have still concluded that COPA is too burdensome.76
In our view, this analysis is incomplete. We agree ·with Professor
Volokh that the question posed by the Supreme Court is not whether
the regulation is in some absolute sense "too burdensome."77 That
form of analysis so far has been restricted to abortion regulation78 and
perhaps also to the dormant commerce clause.79 Rather, the question
the Supreme Court has asked in this context is whether the regulation
is more burdensome than needed.80 If that question could be an
swered by asking whether COPA mandated the least burdensome

adult-ID regime possible, then we believe this statute does impose the
smallest adult-ID regime burden possible.
We believe this because, unlike CDA, COPA includes a catchall
provision that permits "any other reasonable measures that are feasi
ble under available technology."81 This clearly invokes traditional
negligence standards. Whereas CDA required that the technology be
effective, COPA requires only that it be reasonably effective, given
the existing technology. In effect, by definition then COPA creates
the least burdensome adult-ID regime.
Our proposed regulation, however, creates an even less burden
some regime. The adult-ID regime is not the only ID regime possible.
As we outlined at the beginning of this Section, an alternative would
be a kids-mode-browser regime. By requiring that servers segregate
based on whether a KMB was signaled, Congress would thereby enact
a sender-based regulation. This sender-based regulation would be far

74. See 144 CONG. REC. 139, H9902-11 (1998).
75. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 887-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
76. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (preliminarily enjoining
COPA).
77. The "burdensome" test is structurally similar to the test in abortion cases. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
78. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
79. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
80. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (plurality permitting
regulation of "dial-a-porn" to protect kids); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (up
holding New York statute that required keeping of material harmful to minors from minors).
81. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(c)(l)(C) (Supp. 1999).
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less burdensome than CDA or COPA, however - or indeed any
adult-ID regime. And, we believe, it would satisfy the second part of
the Court's test - it would be just as effective.82
The advantages of the KMB regime are many.
•
First, the burden of signaling that the user is a kid would be far
less costly than the burden of signaling that the user is an adult be
cause there would exist no need to verify the signal. An adult ID
needs to be verified because, by granting access that othenvise
would not be permitted, there would be an incentive to cheat. A
KMB , on the other hand, would only block access; there would be
no incentive to lie.
•
Second, the absolute number of people burdened by the regula
tion would likely be lower. Rather than requiring an expensive ID
for every adult wishing full access to the web, only parents who
want their kids to be blocked from access on the web would have
to enable the kids mode. The burden here would thus fall on a
much smaller proportion of the population, and, as described
above, that burden would be less than the burden of adult IDs.
•
Third, the burden on the parents of obtaining the software to en
able this blocking is less than the burden of purchasing blocking or
filtering software. Browsers are (for the moment) free; the district
court found that the cost of blocking software was approximately
•

•

•

$40.00.83
Fourth, the burden of this regulation falls on browser manufactur
ers and web sites with "harmful to minors" material. The burden
on the browser manufacturers is relatively slight; the burden on
the web sites is the same burden that real space sites bear when
they distribute such material. We don't mean to minimize these
costs, but they are less extensive than COPA, and they do not im
pose any burden on recipients without kids.84
Fifth, rather than an elaborate identification system, maintained
either by companies such as AdultCheck or by content providers,
this regime would provide only the single unverified assertion that
the user is a kid. No other personal data would need to be pro
vided; no compromise of financial information would be risked.
Sixth, and relatedly, the cost of providing this identification data is
far cheaper with the KMB than with the adult-ID system. The
82 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
83. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1999).

84. Reno v. A CLU indicates quite clearly, we believe, that the state's interest is limited
to facilitating the choice by parents. See supra note 62. The government in Reno had argued
that the state had an interest, beyond the interest of parents, to protect kids from speech
"harmful to minors" even if the parents did not so wish. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
Reno v. A CLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), available in 1997 WL 136253, at *19-24 (Mar. 19, 1997).
But the Court did not embrace this broader restriction. See Reno v. A CLU, 521 U.S. at 865
& n31.
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code required to enable the two or three dominant browsers to
identify users as kids is relatively trivial; the code to protect ano
nymity with the adult-ID is quite severe because it requires careful
implementation of cryptography and security features.
•
Seventh, this technique would easily apply to other kid-protective
regulations. In the very same Act enacting COPA,85 Congress en
acted the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act.86 That Act
regulated the data that can be collected from a child online. The
weakness in that statute is that there is no easy way to identify a
child. But the change in browsers suggested here would be a way
to identify a child.
•
Finally, this technique would provide an easy way for schools to
regulate access to the Net. A common profile for all users in a
school could be set by a network administrator. That common
profile would then control the types of sites to which the user
could gain access.
These reasons together suggest why this alternative to COPA
would be less burdensome. That is one half of the Court's test. The
other half requires that the alternative be "at least as effective."87
Here again, we believe that it would.
•
First, if the ultimate test is whether the statute enables parents to
control their children, we believe this alternative would be as ef
fective as COP A. Of course, parents would be required to set the
profile for use by kids, but this profile need not be difficult to set.
Indeed, it would be easier to establish this profile than to establish
a profile to collect email through a browser, which users already
do routinely.
•
Second, the kids profile would be easier to implement in places
where kids are most likely to use the net. Schools could establish a
common profile for all users within the school and disable the
ability to build alternative profiles. These locations would then be
protected locally, while under COPA, they are protected only if
the kid does not get access to an adult ID.
•
Third, while it is always possible for a child to take steps to evade
the profile, there is no reason to believe it would be any easier to
evade a profile than to evade an adult check requirement. The
simplest way for a child to evade COPA is to steal a credit card
number, and this is certainly as easy as cracking a security provi-

85. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
86. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681-728 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506).
87. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
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sion built into a browser.88 Indeed, it may be easier. Whereas a
KMB would be protected by a password, the blocks of COPA are
protected by credit card numbers; and while there are plenty of
places that a credit card number can be found (credit card state
ments, receipts, etc.), only the careless would leave a password ly
ing around.
These considerations suggest that this alternative is at least as ef
fective as COPA. This is not to say, however, that either would truly
be effective. Given the flood of sites from jurisdictions beyond the
United States, any effort to regulate United States web sites would
seem plainly ineffective. But between the two, we believe the kids
mode browser dominates COPA and would therefore render COPA
unconstitutional.
We consider one final twist to the KMB Compare the KMB re
gime that we have described to a quite different, though functionally
similar, regime. Suppose the responsibilities for tagging and filtering
were reversed. The sender would be responsible for tagging contents
according to whether they are prohibited to children, and the kids
mode browser would block such items. Although this system would
block exactly the same items as the KMB regime would, a difference
exists. The difference lies in the information thereby revealed that
could be used for purposes other than the legally required blocking.
In the KMB regime that we have described, all senders (even of child
acceptable materials) would know which receivers were children. This
could be useful, as mentioned above, in enabling other child protec
tion regulation; it would also create a risk of other abuse.89 In the al
ternative we consider here, all receivers would know which materials
were labeled as inappropriate for children, even those receivers who
did not signal themselves as children. Thus, these two regimes that
have the same immediate consequences might have quite different
secondary effects. One produces information for the servers; the
other produces information for the surfer.
.

III. SECONDARY CONSEQUENCES
As we said at the start, our aim in this Article extends beyond
COPA to any attempt to regulate access that does not fully consider
the costs. In this Section, we extend our analysis of these costs to a

88. One possible way to evade the limitation would be for a kid to download another
browser and set it up to be free of the kids-ID restriction. But this possibility could be ad
dressed. Again, the browser manufacturers could easily segregate download locations, based
on whether the browser making the request were kids-ID enabled. If it were kids-ID en
abled, then the company would download a kids-ID set browser only. Alternatively, the
kids-ID could be enabled in the operating system {"OS"), making substitution of an adult
OS for a kids OS significantly more difficult.
89. See infra Part III.
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category of costs that we believe have not fully been reckoned in the
debate so far. These costs, in the end, may well be more significant
than the costs of the "problem" that access controls seek to remedy.
In our analysis so far, we have considered three techniques for
regulating access - tagging the sender, tagging the recipient, and
regulating the intermediary to help effect either of the two taggings.
All three strategies, we suggest, have effects that reach beyond their
primary objective. All three envision a general infrastructure that can
be used for purposes beyond those initially intended. This potential,
we believe, should also be counted when reckoning the cost of a given
regulatory strategy.
A.

IDs and Regulability

To effect sender or intermediary control, we envisioned the devel
opment of identity certificates designed to facilitate the credentialling
of certain facts about a recipient - how old that person is, where she
is from, etc. We also proposed the development of a database that
maps IP addresses to jurisdictions.
But it should be clear that if these architectures were enabled for
this speech-regulating purpose, they would both have uses that extend
well beyond this purpose alone. That is, these architectures might fa
cilitate other jurisdiction-based regulation or access control imposed
on senders, beyond the narrow purposes that motivated the initial
change. We might make the Net safe for kids, but in consequence
make it a fundamentally regulable space.
How? Certificates or IP databases would facilitate a more general
structure of jurisdiction-based control, including taxation and privacy
regulations. The reason is straightforward. Local jurisdictions have
the legal authority to regulate their own, both while the citizens are at
home and while they are away.90 A certificate-rich Internet could fa
cilitate the identification of who could be regulated by whom, or what
standards could be imposed upon whom. And this, in turn, could fa
cilitate a more general regulation of behavior in cyberspace.
We might imagine a scheme that looks something like this. States
would enter a compact whereby they, as home jurisdictions, agree to
require senders or intermediaries, within their own jurisdictions, to re
spect the rules of other jurisdictions, in exchange for senders or inter
mediaries in other jurisdictions reciprocating. These rules would
specify the restrictions imposed on citizens from a given jurisdiction,

90. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(2) & cmt. e.(1987) For
example, the Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (Supp. I 1995), crimi
nalizes traveling abroad to engage in illegal sexual acts with children. For an interesting dis
cussion of this provision, see Margaret A. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists at Home:
Do Laws in Sweden, Australia, and the United States Safeguard the Rights of Children as
Mandated by International Law?, 18 FORDHAM lNT'LL.J. 1852, 1902-12 (1995).
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and the range of citizens for whom the restriction applies. For exam
ple, a jurisdiction might specify that its citizens may not engage in
Internet gambling; the jurisdiction within which a gambling server sits,
then, would require the server to check for a person's citizenship, and
condition access based on whether they held the proper credential.
And presumably the jurisdiction would do this only if there were re
strictions that it wanted imposed in other places and that it needed
other jurisdictions to respect.
Thus, if a jurisdiction database or a credential-rich Internet were in
place, we might expect voluntary uses of that infrastructure to prolif
erate, although with differing degrees of desirability. Some voluntarily
imposed restrictions might seem reasonable. For example, recording
companies might refuse access to their web sites from countries where
pirated copies of intellectual property were rampant. Other voluntary
uses might not have such sanguine effects. For example, some Serbs
and Croats might refuse to allow each other access to their web pages.
In both cases, the certificate infrastructure would enable a form of dis
crimination.
Not every ID architecture, however, would effect this increase in
private regulability. Obviously, the more data a certificate architec
ture transmits, the more regulability increases. Likewise, an ID archi
tecture with a narrow focus on children, like the KMB , would facilitate
very little regulation beyond regulation protecting kids. This, by the
way, constitutes a second, and we believe, compelling reason to prefer
it over the adult-ID regulation of COPA; for if the government has
two means available for protecting kids, we believe it should select the
means that produce the least significant secondary effects, unless there
is some analysis showing that the secondary effects also advance some
legitimate government claim.
B.

Labels and Improper Control

The other general solution we have identified for effecting man
dated access control relies upon labels, designed to facilitate filtering
by recipients or intermediaries. The labels might be provided by
senders or by governments in the form of preclearance lists. But as
should be obvious, an inexpensive and widely used labeling infrastruc
ture would have its own secondary impacts, including the possibilities
of more widespread speech regulation and of voluntary individual or
collective uses of labels for blocking beyond the state's legitimate in
terest.
First, if available speech labels describe categories beyond those
that a jurisdiction would normally regulate, the mere availability may
tempt regulation within these new categories. Thus, the \videspread
use of a general labeling infrastructure may start governments on a
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slippery slope toward regulating all sorts of speech, even if the initial
impetus for labeling is limited to only a few kinds of speech.91
Second, labels might be used for voluntary access controls as well
as mandated access controls.92 That is, recipients or intermediaries
might choose to block more exchanges than governments require.
Parents in the United States, for example, may choose to block young
children's access to hate speech or speech about sex education, even
though such speech is legal for children in the United States. Alter
nately, a search engine may provide a filtered search service that,
when queried for "toys," returns links to pages describing children's
toys rather than sex toys, without necessarily reporting that certain
sites have been blocked.93
The availability of voluntary access controls to parents and teach
ers is widely viewed as socially beneficial, since it gives control to peo
ple who can tailor restrictions to individual and local needs. In a
world of perfect transparency and competition, such control imposed
by IAPs or search engines may be unproblematic.
But in practice, a number of reasons suggest that these access con
trols might be less than ideal.
•
First, consumers may have a hard time determining which blocks
are in their own best interest, as the criteria for selection may not
be transparent or readily understandable.94
•
Second, even if the criteria were transparent, the present architec
ture would still allow filtering "upstream" (for example, by a
search engine) without the consumer knowing (thus a nontrans
parency not about the rating, but about who is effecting the fil
ter).95
•
Third, individuals may face a social dilemma about whether to
adopt filters. Individuals may themselves prefer to have filtered
content (to perfect their own choice), but not want society to have
filtered content (to preserve social diversity).96 If everyone can

91. Obviously, the most significant concern here would be jurisdictions outside of the
United States or outside of places where a strong free speech right exists. The norms that
the United States sets for the Net, however, would certainly spill over into those places and
our view is that this spillover ought to be reckoned in any regulatory regime.
92. In fact, voluntary access controls were the main motivation for the creation of PICS.
93. For a demonstration of Alta Vista's "Family Filter," using ratings from SurfWatch,
click on the Family Filter link at <http://www.altavista.com/> (visited Sept. 17, 1999). For a
discussion of the implications, see Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS Comm.
& Ent. L.J. 453 (1997).
94. See Rikki McGinty,
Dec. 5, 1997.

Safety Online: Will It Impede Free Speech?, MEDIA

DAILY,

95. Cf. Weinberg, supra note 93, at n.108.
96.
(1995).

See CASS R SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 21-23
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easily satisfy their individual preference for filtering, the collective
preference for social diversity may be ignored.
•
Fourth, the very act of labeling can have destructive consequences
for the evolution of ideas, at least if those labels are exclusive in
form or in fact. As Niva Elkin-Koren describes, one great virtue
of the Internet is its democratization of the process for drawing
categories.97 Rather than labels imposed by a librarian, search en
gines allow the users to construct different ways of pulling the ma
terial together.
•
Finally, if IAPs bundle filters with service, then the choice among
filters might be less robust than ideal. Put another way, in prac
tice, the competition among filters may not be sufficiently diverse.
This could yield very broad filters, which, if common, could create
secondary impacts on the variety of speech available on the Inter
net - since senders may tailor their speech to what will pass the
filters.
These secondary effects - a slippery slope of regulation and po
tentially chilling voluntary uses of labels - have led one of the
authors previously to describe PICS, which provides the technical in
frastructure for labeling, as "the devil. "98 The other author (one of the
developers of PICS) believes that the net impact of a widespread la
beling infrastructure would be positive, because of the many positive
voluntary uses.99
But whether one supports labels for these secondary uses or not,
we both acknowledge that the consequence of these labels is the ena
bling of this secondary use. And if one were sufficiently troubled by
this secondary use - as for example the ACLU and other civil rights
organizations are100 - then this secondary consequence might well af
fect one's judgment about whether a law mandating KMB is prefer
able to a world with private labels. In other words, if part of the moti
vation for private labels comes from the need to protect kids, that
motivation would be undermined if there were other ways to protect
kids.

97. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO AR.TS & ENT. L.J. 215, 238-40 {1996).
98. Lawrence Lessig, Tyranny in the Infrastructure, WIRED, July 1997, at 96.
99. See Paul Resnick, Filtering Information on the Internet, SCI. AM., March 1997, at 62;
PICS, Censorship, & Intellectual Freedom FAQ {Paul Resnick, ed.) {last modified Aug. 4,
1999) <http://www.w3.org/PICS/PICS-FAQ-980126.html>.
100. See Ann Beeson & Chris Hansen, Fahrenheit 451.2: ls Cyberspace Burning? How
Rating and Blocking Proposals May Torch Free Speech on the Internet (visited Oct. 5, 1999)
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.html>.

November 1999]

Zoning Speech

IV.

427

EMAIL SPAM CONTROLS

We now turn our attention to controls on the distribution of spam
email.101 On the surface, the problem of spam may seem quite differ
ent from those we have considered earlier. With spam the incentives
of the recipients and the regulator are aligned (neither wants the
spam). Only the sender has a contrary interest.
Our model of mandated access controls, however, applies equally
well. Regulations in both cases define some information exchanges as
blocked. They also must define which parties carry the responsibility
for providing the information necessary to enable that blocking. The
effectiveness of any regime will depend on the ability of the responsi
ble parties to comply (especially whether the party responsible for
blocking has sufficient information to decide which items to block)
and on the enforceability of the regulations (especially the ability to
reach senders and intermediaries in other jurisdictions).
The sensitivity analysis for spam controls is also analogous to the
analysis of access controls. For example, various architectural changes
could make recipient type and jurisdiction information available to
senders. Since email transmission protocols do not involve a two-way
communication session between sender and receiver,102 recipients
would have to preregister their types and jurisdictions with some
server that senders would check with prior to sending mass mailings.
If the sender cannot determine a recipient's type and jurisdiction, the
default may be either to permit or prohibit sending. A "permitted
unless prohibited" regime would be similar to current "opt out" lists
for which people can now register. Senders, however, would be re
quired to use these lists, either by sending their spam through a re
mailer that excludes those on the list, or by checking their recipients
against the list.103 As with other schemes for tagging people, secon
dary effects exist that we should account for here. For example, this
system could facilitate the use of opt-out lists for other purposes, or
the use of the registry infrastructure to facilitate creation of other lists.
Alternately, senders may be required to label their messages if
they are spam (according to the definitions of various jurisdictions) to
enable either mandated or voluntary filtering by intermediaries or re-

101. Spam is defined roughly as unsolicited co=ercial email. Various proposed regu
lations have grappled with how to operationalize this definition. For an excellent analysis,
see ALAN SCHWARTZ & SIMSON GARFINKEL, STOPPING SPAM: STAMPING OUT UN
WANTED EMAIL AND NEWS POSTINGS (1998).
102. In email transmission protocols such as SMTP, there is no preliminary end-to-end
session set up that would enable the recipient to send a certificate indicating its jurisdiction
or type. Email transmission is effectively a one-way co=unication.
103. This is the essence of one part of Senator Robert Torricelli's Electronic Mailbox
Protection Act of 1997, S. 875, 105th Cong.
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cipients.104 And here also possible secondary effects exist - for ex
ample, the use of spam tags for other purposes (such as monitoring
what employees receive), or added pressure to label for other criteria
(such as sex or politics).
One essential difference between spam controls and access con
trols is that recipients do not want to receive spam, but some people
may want to receive obscene or other materials over which govern
ments may mandate access controls. Thus it is not necessary to man
date that spam recipients filter out certain messages or that they reveal
their type and jurisdiction. Recipients will do so voluntarily if it will
reduce spam. Hence, sender blocking under a "permitted unless pro
hibited" regime may be more effective for spam control than for ac
cess controls. Where intermediaries carry the blocking responsibili
ties, however, mandates may be necessary. Otherwise, spam senders
may pay intermediaries enough to make them prefer not to filter.
Any regulations of sender behavior suffer from the same jurisdic
tional problems that plague efforts to mandate access controls. A
small country may refuse to enforce other countries' regulations on its
senders and thus become a spam haven. One possible solution would
place the responsibility on intermediaries not to forward improper
email (either spam or untagged spam, depending on the regulation).
If most jurisdictions imposed such a regulation, it would put pressure
on intermediaries in other jurisdictions to voluntarily impose similar
restrictions, else they would not be able to pass messages to restrictive
jurisdictions. If, however, not enough jurisdictions imposed such a
regulation, there could be an overall loss of email connectivity, which
would be inconvenient for legitimate users.
These phenomena have already occurred as a result of voluntary
attempts by IAPs to restrict spam. Some large IAPs have refused to
accept email originating from servers that are known spam sources
(they may also be sources of legitimate email). This results in irate
customers of both IAPs who resultantly cannot communicate non
spam messages to each other. The hope is that these irate customers
will pressure the spam source to mend its ways, and this pressure has
indeed been effective on occasion.105
Given the difficulties and potential side effects of mandated spam
controls, it is worth exploring architectural changes to enable volun
tary access controls. Monetary filtering presents one intriguing possi•

104. Without sender tagging, automated filtering is still possible, but will never be com
pletely accurate at separating spam from non-spam messages. This is the essence of Senator
Frank Murkowski's Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of 1997, S. 771,
105th Cong.
105. See SCHWAR1Z & GARFINKEL, supra note 101, at 85-93.
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bility. A message sender would attach some ecash to each message.106
If the recipient is unhappy about having received a message, she can
keep the money. Each recipient would have a filter automatically re
ject messages with insufficient money attached, with the sender being
notified of the minimum amount required to get the message through.
If widely adopted, this scheme would set up market incentives to vol
untarily curtail sending of unwanted messages.
But here again, the secondary consequences are crucial. The
spam-stamp could constrain noncommercial speech as much as com
mercial speech. It would restrict political messages as well as nonpoli
tical messages. Thus how one changes the architecture to solve the
problem of spam will have effects far beyond the problem of spam.
Our point has been to highlight these effects, and to argue that they
must be accounted in any decision to regulate.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed an abstract model of mandated access
controls, and it has applied that model to two concrete cases. The
model includes three types of actors: senders, intermediaries, and re
cipients. Control decisions are based on three types of information:
the item, the recipient's jurisdiction, and the recipient's type.
With the architecture of today's Internet, senders are ignorant of
the recipient's jurisdiction and type, recipients are ignorant of an
item's type, and intermediaries are ignorant of both. It is easy to see,
then, why, with today's Internet architecture, governments are having
a hard time mandating access controls. Any party on whom responsi
bility might be placed has insufficient information to carry out that re
sponsibility.
While the Internet's architecture is relatively entrenched, it is not
absolutely immutable.
Our abstract model suggests the types of
changes that could enhance regulability. Senders could be given more
information about recipient jurisdiction and type, either through re
cipients providing certificates, or through a database mapping IP ad
dresses to jurisdictions. Recipients could be given more information
about item types, either through senders providing labels or through
government preclearance lists of permitted or prohibited items.
Table 1 summarizes this sensitivity analysis. Since the two inter
ventions are analogous, the analyses of their costs and effectiveness
are analogous as well. In either case, there will be a natural incentive
to provide information if the default action of the responsible party is
to block access unless the information is provided (a "prohibited un-

106. Ecash is simply a digital object that could be attached, as a file is, to an email mes
sage. For a discussion of ecash, see David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, SCI. AM.,
Aug. 1992, at 96, 96-97.
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less permitted" regime). Otherwise, there will be no natural incentive,
and the government will have to require the provision of that informa
tion.
TABLE 1: SENSITIVITY TABLE

Missing
information

Sender

Intermediary

Recipient

•

•

jurisdiction
recipient type
• content of item

•

•

•

jurisdiction
recipient type

•

content of item

Possible architectural and legal
changes

• IP to geography
mapping, jurisdiction certificates
• recipient-type
certificates
• preclearance,
thesauri

As for sender and
recipient, plus:
• responsibility to
assure
sender/recipient
compliance
• use of proxies
and application
gateways

preclearance
sender's selfrating
� third-party ratmg

Consequences

Enables general
regulability of behavior on the Net
based on recipient
type and jurisdiction

Enables private
parties (IAPs and
ISPs) to regulate
behavior on the
Net

Enables greater
control of speech
content on the
Net beyond that
initially required
by governments

Notes

Enforcement
problems significant, if sender
outside the jurisdiction

Enforcement is
easier: since IAPs
are not mobile,
there are few
players, and they
have commercial
assets

Enforcement
problem: number
of recipients leads
to selective enforcement,
though a greater
portion of the
regulable public is
within a given jurisdiction

•

The secondary effects of these two infrastructures are also analo
gous, but quite different. The by-product of a certificate regime is a
general ability to regulate based on jurisdiction and recipient charac
teristics, even for issues beyond content control, such as taxation and
privacy. Such a regime also enables senders voluntarily to exclude re
cipients based on jurisdiction or type, a facility which might be used
for negative as well as positive purposes. The by-product of a widely
used labeling infrastructure is a general ability to regulate based on
item characteristics, even characteristics that governments have no le-
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gitimate reason to regulate. Such a regime also enables intermediaries
and recipients to exclude voluntarily some item types, a facility that
may empower parents and teachers but may also be overused if it is
poorly understood or difficult to configure.
If intermediaries have responsibility for blocking, they will need
both types of information. In addition, architectural changes will be
necessary to enable application layer blocking of individual items
rather than cruder network layer blocking of all traffic from or to an
IP address. A requirement of application layer blocking, however, in
troduces significant costs in terms of openness to innovation and vul
nerability to hardware and software failures. Intermediaries, then, ar
guably constitute the most costly party upon which to impose
responsibility. On the other hand, they are the most easily regulated,
since there are fewer of them, they are more stable, they have assets,
and their governing jurisdictions are clear.
While our sensitivity analysis does suggest consequences that
might not have been readily seen, our ultimate conclusion is one oth
ers have reached as well. It will be difficult for governments to man
date access controls for the Internet. Given today's architecture, any
such mandates would of necessity be draconian or ineffective.
Changes to the technical infrastructure or social practices could en
hance regulability, although such changes would both entail direct
costs and create secondary by-products whose value is debatable.
Given the significant costs of any such architectural change, govern
ments must answer the fundamental question regarding the impor
tance of such changes - perhaps a lessening of governments' tradi
tional power to control the distribution of harmful information would
be preferable.

